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Abstract 
The purpose of our study is to unravel the cognitive mechanisms that underlie risky driving in young novice drivers. We 
hypothesized that lower capacity for cognitive control and rewards predict risky driving and constitute its cognitive basis. 
Inhibitory control was measured with the stop signal reaction time (SSRT) task. Measures of risky driving included: standard 
deviation of lateral position (SDLP), speeding, and red light running. We found that: (1) inhibitory control is still developing 
within the young driver population; (2) lowered inhibitory control had a driving specific effect: young drivers with lower SSRT 
had a higher SDLP; (3) a rewarding context predicts risky driving. 
Keywords: Young drivers; Inhibitory control; Risky driving; Human factors; Reward; Simulators 
1. Introduction  
1.1. Young drivers – a highly risk prone population 
For young drivers, traffic crashes are the leading cause of death in the US and ranked 2nd globally (responsible for 
over 350.000 fatalities and over 15 million injuries annually solely in the 15-29 age group) (National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration [NHTSA], 2006; World Health Organization [WHO], 2002). Compared to other age 
groups, young drivers are involved in a disproportionately large number of crashes (Kweon & Kockelman, 2002; 
Evans, 2004, p. 155) and are also mostly responsible for them (Williams & Shabanovab, 2003). Lack of driving 
experience certainly has a role here (McKnight & McKnight, 2003). However, research in the field of 
developmental cognitive neuroscience has led us to focus on other potentially important explanatory factors 
(Yurgelun-Todd, 2007). 
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1.2. The Dual Systems Model of Adolescent Risk-Taking   
Adolescence is a period in which the developmental trajectory of cognitive control is diverged from development 
of the social-emotional system. More specifically, research in the field of developmental cognitive neuroscience has 
shown that in adolescence: (1) cognitive control is not yet fully developed ; (2) neurobiological changes (for 
instance changes in the dopaminergic system) lead to higher reward-seeking (Casey, Getz & Galvan., 2008; 
Steinberg, 2010; Crone, 2009). Cognitive control is important for the regulation of complex behavior including 
performance of appropriate and inhibition of inappropriate actions (e.g. reward-seeking impulses that conflict with 
long-term plans). Since cognitive control is not fully developed during adolescence, it may be hypothesized this 
maturational lack of cognitive control represents an explanation, additional to lack of driving experience, for 
increased risk behaviour in adolescents relative to adults. In addition, in rewarding contexts, adolescents could be 
especially prone to risk taking behavior given that their developing cognitive control cannot inhibit their increased 
reward-seeking impulses.  
1.3. Implications of the Dual Systems Model for Driving Behavior 
The first study showing evidence for increased risky driving in adolescents versus adults when the social-
emotional system is triggered used a driving video game (Gardner & Steinberg, 2005). A stronger increase in risky 
driving was shown in adolescents than adults when participants played the game in the presence of peers. However, 
no tests of cognitive control were conducted to verify the suggested developmental differences in cognitive control 
between adolescents and adults.   
A recent study has correlated specific measures of cognitive control (i.e., mental shifting, working memory 
updating and response inhibition) and driving performance (Mäntylä, Karlsson & Marklund, 2009). As a measure of 
driving performance, lateral deviation from optimal driving lines was measured in a lane change task. In this study a 
pc-based low-fidelity setting was used that only required steering (i.e. no other driving operations were included in 
the simulation) and age effects were not studied.      
Other recent studies attempted to go beyond correlation and demonstrate a causal connection between cognitive 
control and driving performance (i.e., lateral lane position) using the disinhibiting effects of alcohol (Fillmore, 
Blackburn, & Harrison, 2008) and prefrontal trans-cranial brain stimulation (Beeli, Koenke, Gasser & Jancke, 
2008). Age effects were not studied here either.  
In summary, to the best of our knowledge, the driving specific implications of the described adolescent 
developmental factors have not been tested together yet in a factorial design, on a high-fidelity simulator, using 
different age-groups. 
1.4. Hypotheses 
Based on the two pillars of the Dual Systems Model of adolescent risk taking, we hypothesize that (1) lower 
capacity for cognitive control, (2) a rewarding context, and (3) the interaction of these predict risky driving and 
constitutes part of the cognitive basis for the large number of crashes in the young driver population.  
2. Methods 
2.1. Participants  
Fifty-three young drivers were recruited using three inclusion criteria: (1) age between 17-18 years or 22-24 
years, (2) a (full or provisional) driving license, (3) no more than two years driving experience at the time of testing. 
Participants were not paid but entered a draw for monetary rewards (20, 40, or  60 Euros; see also ‘reward 
manipulation’ section). All participants gave informed consent; had normal/corrected-to-normal vision and none 
suffered from simulator sickness. Participants were divided into two groups based on their age (17-18 year-olds: n = 
31, mean age 17.9 years, 21 men; 22-24 year-olds: n = 22, mean age 22.6 years, 15 men). These groups were 
matched in terms of gender ratios and driving experience (i.e., a third of each group were provisionally licensed 
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novice drivers, and there was no statistically significant difference in the amount of self-reported driving done by the 
17-18 year-olds (5411 km/year) and the 22-24 year-olds (5316 km/year); F(1,51) < 1, p = . 96). 
2.2. Driving simulator   
The experiment was conducted on a fix-based STISIM M400 driving simulator (System Technology Inc. 
Hawthorne, CA) with a force-feedback steering wheel, an instrumented dashboard, brake and accelerator pedals. 
The visual environment was presented on three computer screens (each with 1280 x 800 pixels resolution and 60Hz 
refresh rate) with rear view and side-view mirror images. Data were collected at frame rate.  
2.3. Stop signal paradigm 
As a standard laboratory measure of inhibitory control (and thus cognitive control), the stop signal paradigm was 
used (Logan & Cowan, 1984; for a review, see Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). This task included two practice 
sessions (40 trials each) and one experimental session (96 trials). In each of the sessions, a two-choice reaction time 
task was used requiring participants to press a button (left or right) in response to a stimulus (an ‘X’ or an ’O’) 
presented centrally on screen. In each trial after 1000 ms a fixation cross was presented for 500 ms. Then the stimuli 
were presented for 1000 ms and required a response between 150-1000 ms after onset. This first practice session 
served to determine the individual reaction time (RT) for each participant, to be used as a reference in the second 
practice and experimental session. In the second practice and experimental session, the same two-choice reaction 
time task was used again, but on a randomly selected 25% of the trials, an auditory stimulus (1000 Hz, 70 dB, 
100 ms) was presented in addition to the visual primary-task stimulus. Presentation of this tone designated that the 
subject was to refrain from responding to the stimulus on that trial. Importantly, the time interval between the 
stimulus and the stop-signal was initially set 50 ms below participants’ individual reaction time (RT) Subsequently 
the interval varied dynamically according to a staircase tracking algorithm, to converge on a stop-signal delay at 
which the probability of stopping is 50%. Stop-signal delay was increased by 50 ms if the response was successfully 
inhibited and decreased by 50 ms when it was not. To compute the stop signal reaction time (SSRT) the average  
stop-signal delay was subtracted from the average reaction time of correct responses with a reaction time higher than 
150 ms. The shorter the SSRT the higher inhibitory control is thought to be. 
 
Figure 1. Diagram illustrating the applied stop signal paradigm for SSRT measurement.  (On the diagram  RT + 50ms value is indicated for the 
delay of the auditory stimulus. However, this only illustrates the initial setting; as described above this interval varied during the experiment 
based on the stopping performance.) 
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2.4. Scenarios 
The Simulated Driving Task consisted of two practice sessions that served as a warm-up and two experimental 
sessions. The scenario presented in the experimental sessions was a 28 kilometer daylight driving scenario on a two-
lane road with bidirectional traffic, including both inner- and outer-city sections with a speed limit of 50 and 90 
km/hour respectively. Twelve critical events were presented (e.g., a pedestrian crossing the road, a car suddenly 
appearing from behind a building and pulling back at the street). Critical events were calibrated such that crashes 
could be avoided by braking (when driving at speed limit) or steering around the obstacle. Apart from the critical 
events, other vehicles were presented on the roadway at random intervals but required no passing or braking on the 
part of the driver. In the scenario, participants had to drive through 18 intersections equipped with traffic lights (red 
n=10; green n=4; yellow n=4 in randomized order). 
2.5. Reward manipulation  
For the first trip, participants were instructed to drive as they would normally do. For the second trip, response 
conflict was introduced by providing monetary reinforcement for quickly completing the drive, but also for driving 
safely and not making any violations (i.e., stopping at a red light, not crossing a full line) or collisions (Fillmore et 
al., 2008). It was explained that participants could increase their chances of earning money by completing the trip in 
the shortest finish time, but for each violation (except speeding) or collision, one minute of penalty time would be 
imposed. To provide a point of reference, participants were informed that this trip was of similar length as the first 
trip and they were told their finish time of the first trip. Travel time was projected on screen during the second trip. 
In line with Fillmore et al (2008), we chose not to balance the order and always presented the trip without reward 
first. This decision was based on Fillmore’s pilot studies that showed pronounced performance decrements when 
participants moved from a rewarded condition to a non-rewarded condition. Such negative contrast effects from 
removed rewards have been also well-documented in the learning literature in both animals and humans Fillmore 
(personal communication, December 16, 2011). 
2.6. Data collection and analysis 
2.6.1. Stop signal reaction time (SSRT) 
First the average reaction time was computed based on the reaction times on correct responses that were higher 
than 150 ms. Then SSRT was calculated by subtracting the average stop signal delay from the average reaction time 
(Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). The shorter the SSRT, the higher inhibitory control is thought to be. To determine if 
the two groups were different in terms of inhibitory control, SSRT was analyzed in an ANOVA with age as 
between-subjects factor.  
2.6.2. Risky driving behaviour. 
Measures of risky driving included responses to critical events (number of collisions), speeding (percentage of 
total distance above the speed limit), red light running (number of times) and standard deviation of lateral lane 
position (SDLP). SDLP has been shown a sensitive measure of driver impairment for example due to increased 
mental workload and various drugs (De Waard, 1996; Ramaekers, 2003). SDLP was also found to be a reliable 
characteristic of an individual’s normal driving behavior; test-retest reliability measured from young and middle-
aged individuals are generally higher than r = 0.75 (O’Hanlon, Brookhuis, Louwerens, 1986).  In the computation of 
SDLP, segments associated with lane changes were excluded. . A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was 
conducted first to provide an overall measure of driver performance as a function of experimental conditions. 
Univariate statistical analyses were then carried out by entering the different measures of risky driving behavior as 
dependent measures into four separate repeated measures ANOVAs with within-subjects factor reward (2: no, yes), 
between-subjects factor age (2: 17-18 year-olds, 22-24 year-olds), and inhibitory control (SSRT) as a continuous 
predictor variable.  
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3. Results      
3.1. Inhibitory control  
SSRT was significantly lower in the 22-24 year-olds (m = 209 ms; sd = 37 ms) than in the 17-18 year-olds 
(m = 230 ms; sd = 25) (F(1, 51 ) = 4.860, p = .032)  indicating that basic cognitive control (i.e. inhibitory control) 
still improves within the young driver population. 
3.2. Risk Behavior  
Results are summarized in Table 1 and 2. Descriptive statistics on different risk behaviours are presented in 
Table 1 and results of the ANOVAs testing for the effects of inhibitory control, reward and age are in Table 2. 
3.2.1. Response to critical events  
Although the number of critical events resulting in collisions was higher in 17-18 year-olds than 22-24 year-olds 
without and with rewards, there were no significant main or interaction effects for the critical events. 
3.2.2. Standard Deviation of Lateral Lane Position (SDLP)  
There was no difference between the 17-18 year-olds and 22-24 year-olds in SDLP without or with reward. 
Importantly, there was a main effect of inhibitory control. A correlation analysis between the measure of inhibition 
(SSRT) and SDLP indicated that with increased inhibitory control there was a decrease in SDLP (r = .443, p = .001). 
Unexpectedly, SDLP was smaller in the ride with than without the reward. 
 
Figure 2. Scatter plot illustrating the positive correlation between standard deviation of lateral  position (SDLP) and inhibitory control (SSRT). 
3.2.3. Speeding  
The percentage of total distance drivers were speeding was higher in 17-18 year-olds than 22-24 year-olds 
without and with rewards, but the main effect of age was only marginally significant. In addition, following our 
expectations, speeding increased when participants were offered a reward relative to no reward (57.5 versus 39.6).  
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3.2.4. Red light running 
Although red light running was more common in 17-18 year-olds than 22-24 year-olds in the ride without reward 
it was similar in the ride with reward. There was however no main effect of age or an interaction of age and reward. 
Following our expectations, red light running increased when participants were offered a reward relative to no 
reward (.68 versus .15). In the analyses of red light running, data of six participants (two 17-18 year-olds, four 22-24 
year-olds) fell outside the tripled inter-quartile range and these were excluded from the analyses as outliers.  
Table 1. Means (m) and standard errors (SE) of risky driving behavior by age group and reward condition 
 No reward Reward 
 
17-18 yr 22-24 yr 17-18 yr 22-24 yr 
SDLP 
(meters) 
m=.294 m=.292 m=.279 m=.256 
SE=.013 SE=.016 SE=.011 SE=.014 
Speeding  
(% of distance) 
m=44,5 m=34,7 m=61.9 m=53.2 
SE=4.43 SE=5.3 SE=3.43 SE=4.1 
Red light running  
(# of times) 
m=.31 m=0 m=.67 m=.70 
SE=.09 SE=.12 SE=.18 SE=.23 
Critical events  
(# of accidents) 
m=5.8 m=4.7 m=5.6 m=4.7 
SE=.46 SE=.55 SE=.55 SE=.66 
Table 2. Univariate main effects (left) and interactions (right).  Significant effects in bold. 
 
Effects 
inhibitory control reward age 
inhibitory control  
x 
 reward 
age  
x 
 reward 
 
SDLP 
(meters) 
F=9.9 F=10.1 F<1 F<1 F=1.64 
p=.003 p=.003 p=.49 p=.48 p=0.21 
 
Speeding  
(% of distance) 
F<1 F=33.3 F=2.9 F<1 F<1 
p=.81 p<.001 p=.095 p=.48 p=.87 
 
Red light running  
(# of times) 
F<1 F=11.4 F<1 F<1 F=1.1 
p=.61 p=.002 p=.39 p=.73 p=.30 
 
Critical events  
(# of accidents) 
F=1.26 F<1 F=2.15 F=1.12 F<1 
p=.27 p=.77 p=.15 p=.29 p=.80 
 
4. Conclusion 
The results show that inhibitory control still improves beyond the age of 18. Others have shown a decrease in 
impulsivity, which may be regarded the opposite of inhibitory control, with age in a sample of individuals ranging in 
age from 7 to 29 (Galvan et al., 2007) and between groups from ages 14–16 to 20–22 (Leshem and Glicksohn, 
2007). Although this suggests that inhibitory control continues to develop over the course of adolescence and early 
adulthood, here the comparison of groups between ages 17-18 and 22-24 years showed directly and with objective 
measures that inhibitory control still improves after 18 years. Although improvements have been demonstrated on 
various measures of inhibitory control (e.g. stroop-, antisaccade-task) in the field of developmental cognitive 
neuroscience, to the best of our knowledge these improvements were not demonstrated to extend beyond 18 years 
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(Bunge & Crone, 2009). This is most likely due to differences in participant grouping. While we compare 17-18 
year olds with 22-24 year olds, others tend to either focus on earlier adolescence (Adelman et al., 2002) or lump 
participants in wider age groups (Williams, Ponesse, Schachar, Logan, & Tannock, 1999). In the latter study, 
Williams et al. sampled inhibitory control in all ages between 6-81years using the same stop signal task as we did. 
However, the participants were grouped using wider age ranges e.g. 13-17 vs. 18-29 years. Although the latter 
grouping is reasonable for an extensive study on the development of inhibitory control throughout the whole life 
span, it might miss the fine grained differences that our observations highlight within the young driver population, 
which are especially relevant from a traffic safety prospective.  
In line with our hypothesis that lower capacity for cognitive control predicts risky driving, lowered inhibitory 
control had a driving specific effect: young drivers with lower inhibitory control (SSRT) drove with higher SDLP. 
Mäntylä et al. (2009) also studied the relationship between driving performance (i.e. lane change accuracy) and 
cognitive control but only found a significant overall correlation between driving performance and  ‘working 
memory updating’ – another component of cognitive control. The difference between our results might be due to 
differences in the participants’ age as well to differences in our driving tasks. They focused on teenagers (15-19) 
with minimal driving experience (4% held a driving licence) while all of our subjects were either fully (63%) or 
provisionally (37%) licensed. They used a rudimentary lane changing task in a low-fidelity setting that required no 
other driving operations than from maneuvering the steering wheel whereas here a more complete driving scenario 
was implemented on a high-fidelity simulator. Nevertheless, when divided based on computer gaming history, 
Mäntylä’s “low-game” participants (gaming  <1 hour/week) also showed highly correlated inhibitory control and 
driving task performance.  
The results also showed support for our hypothesis that a rewarding context predicts risky driving since speeding 
and red light running occurred more often in the trip with than without reward. Congruently, Steinberg and his 
colleagues found that peer-presence (i.e., a potential source of reward) leads to increased risk taking in a driving 
context (Gardner & Steinberg, 2005; Chein, Albert, O’Brien, Uckert, & Steinberg, 2010 ). However they only 
studied red-light-running behavior and did so in a highly simplified video game where participants could only 
control a single response key to activate the brakes of a car that they saw from a third-person view. Our findings 
thus add to the existing literature by showing the effect of a monetary reward (versus peer presence), including 
different types of risk behavior, and using a more realistic setting in a high fidelity simulator. The unexpected effect 
of reward on SDLP might be the result of a learning effect due to not balancing the order of trips across subjects. 
This part of the procedure was derived from Fillmore et al. (2008) that always presented the trip with reward as 
second trip. Although not significant, their results show a similar decrease of SDLP in the second trip.  
With regard to the hypothesized interaction between reward and inhibitory control, the effects of reward on risky 
driving behavior were not further modified by our measure of inhibitory control. Fillmore et al. (2008) showed that 
an increase in SDLP between sessions with versus without alcohol was even more pronounced when a reward was 
offered and concluded that this was due to the disinhibitory effect of alcohol. Possibly variance in inhibitory control 
in our study was not large enough for such an interaction to occur. Unfortunately Fillmore et al. (2008) used another 
measure of inhibition (failures of response inhibition on a go/no-go task) which complicates a direct comparison of 
our inhibition effects. As inhibitory control increases linearly with aging (Casey et al., 2008), a comparison of age 
ranges that are further apart probably would increase between-group differences in inhibition. However, selection of 
age ranges in the present study was limited by licensing age, which is 17 in Belgium. Still we might increase the 
difference by solely selecting 17 year-olds in the youngest group. An alternative strategy might be to include 
different measures of inhibition as measures might differ in terms of sensitivity. However, future research is 
necessary to resolve these issues.  
Finally, the data described here were collected in a driving simulator and this may have influenced the experience 
of driving. First, simulated driving might overestimate reckless driver behavior; since accidents in the simulator can 
never have equally grave consequences as real crashes, participants might not attain equal degree of motivation in 
the simulated environments. Second, however, as noted by others, it might also be argued that simulators actually 
overestimate the level of driver performance, given that much of the daily distractions that divide the driver’s 
attention in real traffic (e.g. passengers, phone calls) were not present in our study (Fillmore et al., 2008). Finally, 
certain sensory and perceptual cues are lacking in a fixed based simulator (Kemeny & Panerai, 2003). However, in 
our experiment the generalizability (relative validity) of differences between compared conditions (i.e., reward, 
inhibitory control, age) is more important than absolute correspondence of the speeds and other driving parameters 
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obtained in simulation to those obtained on real roads (Charlton, 2007; Godley, Triggs, and Fildes, 2002).Therefore, 
it can be concluded that the results are relevant as the different patterns of results are expected to occur outside the 
simulator, in reality. In fact, recent  reviews and studies evaluating the behavioral validity of simulators already 
provide some evidence for simulator validity in domains such as speed, lateral position, brake onset, divided 
attention, driving errors and risky traffic behavior assessment (Fisher, Rizzo, Caird & Lee, 2011; Shechtman, 
Classen, Awadzi, & Mann, 2009). Still, future research aimed at validation of our simulator data on a real road track 
will be necessary to bolster this conclusion (Young, Regan, & Lee, 2009).  
4.1. Applications 
Recent research has shown that cognitive control functions are flexible and can be trained, leading to 
improvements in performance (Cassavaugh & Kramer, 2009). To date, driver training or interventions could not be 
designed to target exact cognitive mechanisms.  By pinpointing the cognitive and affective mechanisms of risky 
driving behavior (i.e. the role of inhibitory control and rewards), these can become specific targets of improvement 
in future driver training programs aimed at safe driving and the decrease of fatalities in young novice drivers.  
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